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Aircraft accidents are generally the end result of a number of latent conditions
arising in the organizational and managerial sectors. These conditions frequently
permit or even motivate the unsafe acts by the flight crew. The Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a system safety tool for the
investigation and analysis of underlying human causal factors in aircraft
accidents. Using the HFACS framework, four researchers classified the human
factors identified by the Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and
Prevention Center (CENIPA) during the investigation of a mishap (PR-AFA) that
happened in Brazil in 2014. CENIPA argued that errors and violations by both
pilots contributed to the accident. Results of this study indicate that inappropriate
decision making by upper-level management had an adverse effect on the
performance of the PR-AFA pilots. Most importantly, safety strategies to mitigate
unsafe acts by crewmembers should receive significant attention from the highest
managerial levels of the organization.
Approximatelly 80% of aircraft mishaps are associated with human errors (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003). The terms human error and procedural violations may have limited value in
preventing future accidents (Reason, 1997, 1998). These factors could indicate where the
breakdown occurred, but provide no guidance as to why an accident occurred or how to prevent
one from occurring in the future (ICAO, 2013; Reason, 1998; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Several accident causation models have been developed to assist in mitigating human errors and
violations. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) describes four
levels of failure (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) proposed in the Reason
model (Reason, 1997, 1998). HFACS is a system safety tool that can be used within aviation
sectors to systematically and effectively examine underlying human causal factors during the
investigation of aircraft accidents. This tool facilitates the development of data-driven investment
safety strategies to enhance aviation safety addressing areas where the benefits will be the
highest.
A Cessna Citation CE-560XLS+, registered as PR-AFA, crashed in Brazil in August
2014, claiming the lives of seven people, including a Brazilian presidential candidate during the
political campaign. The Brazilian Aeronautical Accidents and Prevention Center (CENIPA)
thoroughly investigated this accident (CENIPA, 2014) in accordance with the ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) (ICAO, 2016). Weather conditions were below flight
minimums at the destination airport. The crewmembers performed an instrument flight rules
(IFR) procedure and missed approach with a profile different from the one prescribed in the
aeronautical chart. In addition, CENIPA (2014) presented other human factors issues that could
have contributed to the accident, such as fatigue, spatial disorientation, and poor team dynamics.
Using the HFACS framework, the purpose of this case study was to analyze the human factors
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elements, including errors and violations, which may have contributed to the accident. Findings
were expected to suggest new insights to mitigate the risk of aircraft accidents due to human
factors.
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
Safety professionals have used organizational and systemic models during the
investigation of aircraft accidents as well as the development of the ensuing mitigation strategies
since the 1990s (Reason, 1997, 1998). Human factors models such as the “Swiss Cheese”, also
known as Reason’s model (Reason, 1997; 1998), and the HFACS model (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2003) provide a better capture of the complexity of organizational and social-technical systems.
Therefore, they enable safety professionals to have a greater understanding of the factors that
may contribute to aircraft mishaps (Shappell et al., 2007). Reason’s model, the most popular
accident causation framework, describes the interactions between active failures by frontline
personnel and latent conditions. According to Reason (1997, 1998), it is inadequate to attribute
accidents to individual operator performance. Human errors and violations are the end result
rather than the cause of mishaps, and just the starting point of the safety investigation process.
Accident investigators must focus on events beyond the Unsafe Acts by pilots to latent
preexisting conditions, which are usually induced by fallible decisions made on managerial
levels.
a
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Figure 1. The HFACS Framework. Adapted from the “Human error approach to aviation
accident analysis: The human factors analysis and classification system” by Wiegmannn, D. A.,
& Shappell., S. A. (2003). Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
The HFACS framework was drawn upon the concept of latent conditions and active
failures by Reason (1997). It bridges the gap between theory and pratice by providing safety
professionals with a scientifically tested framework designed to investigate the active failures by
operators. Additionally, it also encourages safety experts to investigate the latent conditions
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upstream in the organization (Shappell et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The HFACS
model succesfuly describes human errors at four levels: Unsafe Acts of Operators, Preconditions
for Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision, and Organizational Influences. The HFACS framework is
presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.
Each lower level is impacted by the higher levels in the HFACS framework (Li et al.,
2008). The HFACS model goes beyond the identification of unsafe acts by frontline employees,
and provides a better understanding of the latent conditions that permited or even prompted
Unsafe Acts by human operators. Human errors and violations are viewed as consequences of
systemic failures, and are the starting point of an investigation process (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2003). The use of the HFACS framework during the investigation of mishaps facilitates the
identification of the contributing factors to the accident, the elaboration of hypotheses, and the
development of safety recommendations designed to mitigate latent conditions and Unsafe Acts,
greatly improving aviation safety.
The PR-AFA Accident
The PR-AFA, a Cessna Citation CE-560XLS+, was on a non-scheduled flight from
Santos Dumont Airport (SBRJ) bound for Santos Aerodrome (SBST), in Brazil, on August 13,
2014. At the time of the accident, the destination airport was operating under severe weather
conditions with mist and rain significantly affecting both visibility and operational ceiling. The
crewmembers informed the Aerodrome Flight Information Service (AFIS) their intention to
perform a non-directional beacon (NDB) instrument flight rules (IFR) approach procedure to
land on runway 35. However, they did not follow the profile of the Echo 1 IFR procedure.
CENIPA raised the hypothesis that the captain used the aircraft flight management system
(FMS) to intercept a direct approach to land at SBST, even though the aircraft manual warned
the crew that the FMS visual approach mode must not be utilized in instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) as a substitute for IFR approaches. The pilots discontinued their approach, but
did not follow the profile prescribed in the aeronautical chart. The PR-AFA crashed into the
ground at a high negative pitch angle and at a high speed, killing two pilots and five passengers,
including a well-known Brazilian politician who was campaigning for president. The mishap was
thoroughly investigated by CENIPA (CENIPA, 2014).
In addition to the aforementioned factors, CENIPA (2014) posited in its final report that
both pilots had not had the adequate and prescribed training while transitioning to the CE560XLS+ (they were not qualified in that aircraft model). CENIPA (2014) also argued that other
human factors issues could have contributed to this mishap. For example, at the time of the
accident, there was a self and organizational pressure on the pilots relative to flight schedule due
to the political campaign of a passenger. Analysis of the copilot’s voice, speech, and tone
indicated compatibility with fatigue and somnolence. Moreover, both pilots had difficulties in
applying crew resource management concepts. CENIPA (2014) also postulated that the first
officer operational capabilities (e.g., cockpit and operational routine management, provision of
support as a pilot-not-flying [PNF], effectiveness in the execution of procedures) were
inadequate. Those conditions degraded the crewmembers’ aeronautical decision making process
(ADM).
Following CENIPA (2014), the captain had previously utilized the FMS resources (visual
mode) for making direct approaches and very likely used the FMS for reducing the time spent in
the Echo 1 IFR procedure. Because the pilots did not follow the profile of the Echo 1 IFR
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procedure, and due to a tailwind, the crewmembers had difficulty in maintaining a stabilized
approach. Thus, they had to perform a missed approach. Yet, after the missed approach the flight
crew attempted to maintain visual meteorological conditions (VMC), despite the bad weather
conditions. CENIPA (2014) also claimed that the inadequate training, the conflicting relationship
and synergy between crewmembers, and the pilots’ personal characteristics (e.g., captain
authoritarian, first officer passive) hindered the dynamics of the crewmembers, and greatly
increased their workload. Moreover, such conditions favored the onset of spatial disorientation of
an incapacitating type during a high-risk flight-condition.
Methods
CENIPA is a Brazilian Air Force organization responsible for the investigation of aircraft
accidents and incidents involving civil and Brazilian Air Force aircraft in Brazil, all in
accordance with the ICAO SARPs. The final report of the PR-AFA, the unit of this case study,
was available at the CENIPA website. Using both tabular and narrative data from the PR-AFA
final report, each human causal factor was classified using the HFACS framework (Wiegmann &
Shappel, 2003). One researcher, who had previous HFACS training and experience using the
model during the investigation of aircraft mishaps, made the initial classification. After that, the
remaining members of the research team, all with experience in aviation safety and human
factors, reviewed potential classifications independently until all researchers reached an
agreement. Considering the high inter-rater reliability found in previous studies using the
HFACS model (Li et al., 2008; Shappell et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), consensus
classification was deemed appropriate for the study.
Findings and Discussions
The current study presents an analysis of the accident involving the PR-AFA, a Cessna
Citation CE-560XLS+, using the final report by CENIPA (2014) and the HFACS tool
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The HFACS model provides safety investigators with an
empirically tested framework that bridges the gap between theory and practice, and assists in
identifying and classifying human errors and violations in aircraft mishaps. In addition, it helps
safety professionals to focus on latent conditions, active failures, and their interrelationships
(Wiegmann & Shappel, 2003). Most importantly, it permits the identification of the underlying
causes of Unsafe Acts by crewmembers.
The analysis of this accident started with the level most closely tied to the mishap:
Unsafe Acts of operators (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). In the first level, researchers agreed
that the following actions by the crewmembers could be classified as:
1. Execution of the Echo 1 IFR procedure by the flight crew even though the weather was
below the minimums for the procedure (Exceptional Violation);
2. Probable use of the aircraft FMS by the pilots to make a direct approach (Routine
Violation);
3. Nonconformity with the profile established in the aeronautical chart during the
procedure (Routine Violation) and ensuing missed approach (Exceptional Violation);
4. Attempt to maintain VMC during the missed approach (Decision Error); and
5. Inadequate response to spatial disorientation (Percpetual Error).
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Latent conditions, arising in the managerial and/or organizational levels, such as failing
to provide crews with proper training, are unavoidable components of the aviation system. They
could combine with local triggering conditions and allow or even induce unsafe acts by frontline
personel (Reason, 1997, 1998). Unsafe acts of crewmembers can reduce safety margins and lead
to mishaps. However, it is paramount to investigate the second level of the HFACS framework,
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, in order to better prevent future accidents. For example, both
pilots had not received the prescribed training to transition to the Citation CE-560XLS+
(Personal Readiness). Therefore, they did not have the adequate knowledge and skills to safely
operate the aircraft, or the adequate experience for the complexity of the situation (Mental
Limitations). In addition, such conditions reduced the pilots’ situational awareness (SA) and
demanded more cognitive efforts during the IFR procedure, especially the missed approach. The
copilot’s fatigue and somnolence were Adverse Physiological States that also reduced the
crewmembers’ SA, thus precluding their ADM process and the safe operation of the aircraft
(CENIPA, 2014). In the final report, CENIPA argued that both pilots had difficulty in applying
CRM concepts. Even more, they had an unfriendly relationship before the accident. Hence, this
situation led to poor coordination, confusion, low SA, and inadequate ADM by both pilots (FAA,
2016). Moreover, these factors most likely contributed to the spatial disorientation of the flight
crew. The researchers agreed that loss of SA, complacency, and overconfidence (Adverse Mental
States) were factors that adversely influenced the pilots’ performance and ADM. The operational
environment, the deteriorating weather before and during the time of the accident, also had an
adverse effect on the Unsafe Acts by the flight crew. First officer operational weaknesses as a
crewmember (Mental Limitations) also was a precondition for the unsafe acts committed by the
flight crew.
The Unsafe Supervision level of the HFACS framework connects Unsafe Acts by pilots
to the level of the front-line supervisors. The role of front-line supervisors is to provide their
personnel leadership, training, guidance, and the adequate tools to perform their jobs efficiently
and safely (ICAO, 2013; Shappell et al., 2007). At the supervisory leadership level, researchers
identified actions and inactions that had an adverse effect on the safety of the PR-AFA. For
instance, both pilots were neither provided with nor required to undergo the adequate and
prescribed training before operating the aircraft. Leadership also failed to provide proper CRM
training for both crewmembers. Middle management failed to identify and correct risky
behaviors by the captain (e.g., inappropriate use of the aircraft FMS; poor CRM skills), by the
first officer (e.g., lack of aptitude and skills to act as a crewmember), and the unfriendly
relationship of the crewmembers. Additionally, front-line supervisor(s) failed to provide
adequate rest in order to mitigate fatigue (Inadequate Supervision). The fourth level of the
framework describes the contributions of fallible decisions in upper-levels of management that
have a negative effect on the lower levels of the model. Corporate-level decision-making for
organization resources, including monetary and human resource management (e.g., inadequate
CRM training), played a role in this accident (Resource Management). A poor safety culture
(Reason, 1997, 1998), and ill-defined safety policies (ICAO, 2013) contributed to the mishap
(Organizational Climate). Finally, organizational pressures due to the presidential campaign
(e.g., time; schedule), and inadequate safety programs to mitigate safety hazards were latent
conditions that allowed and prompted unsafe acts by the crewmembers (Organizational Process).
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Conclusion
Human errors and violations in aviation are elusive and complex to investigate. The
accident involving the PR-AFA was analyzed using the HFACS framework. This analysis,
demonstrated that actions and inactions at the highest organizational levels can promulgate
throughout lower levels. Moreover, those actions and inactions could allow or even motivate
Unsafe Acts by crewmembers on the aircraft flight deck. Furthermore, it indicated that the
HFACS framework could provide accurate information that should be used for the development,
implementation, and the quantifiable assessment of effective safety intervention and mitigation
strategies addressing the highest organizational levels. The most cost-effective strategies with the
greatest improvement in safety should target these areas (Li et al., 2008; Reason, 1997, 1998;
Shappel et al., 2007; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
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